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I. INTRODUCTION
We are hesitant to point out generational shifts.' Most troubling, it
forces us to acknowledge our own aging and perhaps unfulfilled ambitions. Moreover, the line between one generation and the next is always
murky, and making the demarcation risks upsetting individuals by placing them on one side of the divide or the other (or, even worse, on
neither side). The exercise, however, can be useful-for example, the
issues of the "Baby Boomers" are fundamentally different from those
of "Generation X," and it is beneficial to treat them separately.2 Against
my better judgment, therefore, I begin this Review Essay with an assertion about generational change. Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West's book,
Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan: The
Impact of Formal and Informal Rules, marks a new era in the field of

*

The Australian National University. I appreciate Luke Nottage and Trevor Ryan's

comments and suggestions, though of course I remain responsible for all errors and opinions.
1.
Much more hubristic than my declaration of a so-called "changing of the guards" in
a narrow academic discipline was Tom Brokaw's declaration that those people, mostly men,
who fought in World War II for the United States comprised the greatest generation ever. See
TOM BROKAW: THE GREATEST GENERATION (Random House 1998).

2.
Among others, demographers, social scientists, and marketers find it useful to identify generational eras. See generally WILLIAM STRAUSS & NEIL HOWE, GENERATIONS: THE
HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE (1991) (interpreting U.S. history by identifying generations
and their characteristics).
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comparative Japanese law and cements the two authors as the doyens of
this "Next Generation. 3
Despite a few claims to the contrary,4 the book does not hold itself
out to be generational or paradigm shifting. It is generally a straightforward account of economic legal ordering in Japan, achieved though a
series of well-researched, insightfully considered, and eloquently described case studies. The subject matter is not new; rather, as the authors
confess, it has been well covered by a number of other scholars from
economics, business, sociology, area studies, and law. This study is
unique, nonetheless, in its application of a methodology of combined
institutional and empirical approaches to this subject matter. While this
is the new knife with which Milhaupt and West cut the old cake, it is the
skill of the practitioners that makes the exercise most worth consuming.
This in itself does not suggest the shift that I propose the book and its
authors represent; the change only becomes evident when contrasting the
study with scholarship of the immediately prior era.
This Review Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss the
methodology of the book, which, while being the strong point of the endeavor, also gives rise to a few perfunctory criticisms. Part HI reviews the
book's content or message, including its overarching themes, its numerous
discrete theoretical points, and its understated descriptive value. In Part IV,
I return to my perhaps hasty declaration that this work marks a generational baton-pass and suggest the importance of the shift. I conclude,
without the typical caveats paragraph, in a resounding recommendation of
this new book and what it represents.
II. THE METHODOLOGY
The authors assert that it is the methodology itself that distinguishes
their book from others.6 By this they mean they are the first to apply their
theoretical framework and empiricism to the subject matter. I agree with
3.
1 like to include at least one reference to a film or television series-thus, this reference to the "Next Generation" from the Star Trek television and film series. See Star Trek: The
Next Generation (CBS television broadcast, 1987-1994).
4.
Thankfully, and uncommonly in current U.S. legal literature, claims of "our approach ...[being] novel in studies of Japan" are limited to a few asides presumably necessary
to satisfy skeptical publishers. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL

RULES

2 (2004).

5.
ERNANCE

See, e.g., TAKEO HOSHI & ANIL K. KASHYAP, CORPORATE FINANCING AND GovIN JAPAN: THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE (2001); DAVID FLATH, THE JAPANESE

ECONOMY (2000);
AOKI

6.

FINANCE, GOVERNANCE,

& GARY R. SAXONHOUSE

AND COMPETITIVENESS

2000).
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 1-3.
EDS.,

IN JAPAN (MASAHIKO
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the authors in their claims about the originality of the approach and the
success with which it produces important results. This book gives more
insight into the actual economic institutions and corporate governance in
Japan than any other I have read. Indeed, I understand some of the chapters have been translated into Japanese and read by Japanese individuals
curious to know how their economic institutions operate.7 Without detracting from the significant accomplishments of this book, however, I
would like to probe into the precise nature of the book's methodology
and its application, as I find the answer less obvious than the book's introductory and concluding chapters contend.
The first part of the confusion regards the precise theoretical framework on which the book operates. The introduction clearly establishes
Douglass North's "new economic institutional analysis" as applied to
Japan by Masahiko Aoki as the book's starting point.8 Given Aoki's
work, the distinguishing factor for this study seems to be its focus on
legal institutions.9 Furthermore, Milhaupt and West employ an important
second theoretical thread within their framework: a serious treatment of
informal norms such as business and social customs. As best argued by
Milhaupt in an essay not included in this volume, developing a full and
accurate image of economic institutions in Japan-as well as anywhere
else-requires consideration of both formal legal rules and informal
norms.'0 This seems a fairly obvious conclusion, but the authors' full
embracement of this approach is part of what distinguishes them as the
leaders of the next generation of scholars. The difficulty of this theoretical
framework is not necessarily in the ideas, but in the fact that its dual
strands are applied implicitly rather than explicitly for much of the book,
particularly in the earlier chapters. To strengthen the overarching themes
of the book, I would have appreciated more identification and explanation
of the specific institutions, subinstitutions, rules, and norms in play-and
how they interacted-within each chapter.

7.

See Hiroo Sono, The Multiple Worlds of "Nihon-h6," in THE MULTIPLE WORLDS OF

JAPANESE LAW: DISJUNCTIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS
reprintedin 12 J. JAPANESE L./ZJAPANR 50, 54 (2001)

(Thomas Ginsburg et al. eds., 2001),
(noting the wide use in Japanese trans-

lation of Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United
States: Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.767 (1999), translated as
Naze Sdkaiya wa nakunaranainoka?Yusuri to kabunushi Sdkai no h6 to keizaigaku [Why
Don't Sokaiya Go Away? The Law and Economics of Blackmail and Shareholders' Meetings],
1145 JURISUTO 60; 1146 JURISUTO 114; 1147 JuRIsuTo 97 (1998) (Kenichi Osugi trans.)).
8.
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 2-3 (referencing DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981) and DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990)).
9.
Id. at3.
See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal
10.
Rules in Japanese CorporateGovernance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2001).
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The second distinguishing element of the authors' approach is their
empiricism. Without a doubt, the empirical evidence brought to this
work makes it stand out. The empiricism too has two strands. The first is
economic modeling and the second is sociological fieldwork techniques.
To do their economic modeling, the authors' modus operandi is data
mining the voluminous amount of statistics compiled almost savant-like
by various Japanese organizations." This is impressive stuff. My mouth
repeatedly dropped open when I read about the discovery of collected
datasets and the ability to push these numbers through interesting and
relevant models to produce useful conclusions. But, as we all know,
numbers alone cannot paint a full picture of something as diverse, subtle,
and beautiful as a society. Therefore, Milhaupt and West again impress
immensely by conducting the interviews, observations, and collection
that provide a nuanced qualitative view. Just some of the people consulted appear to be: ambulance-chasing lawyers, business failures,
organized crime bosses, cops, high-flying corporate types, IT entrepreneurs, and so on. Occasionally, I wanted as much detail on the field
study parameters as was given for the economic modeling, but this really
is just a niggle. Combining these hard and soft approaches creates an
extremely satisfying sense of the actual environment surrounding the
various legal economic institutions covered.
Given how robustly the authors explain their subject, it would be
greedy to ask for more methodologically. Nevertheless, let me suggest
two additional elements that would have enhanced even further the picture they paint. The first is a closer and more detailed account of the
historical development that resulted in the institutions considered. This
was done on occasion-for example, with the narrative in chapter 4 on
the jusen failures. Often, however, I thought further development of the
background of certain institutions might better explain many of the identified problems, particularly given the references to path dependence
theory." To provide but one example, Frank Bennett has conducted a
"forensic analysis" to show how there are historical reasons explaining
11.
Best evidencing this national characteristic and its application is West's use of volumes of data collected on eighteenth and nineteenth century rice prices. See Mark D. West,
Private Orderingat the World's FirstFutures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000). Others have noted, however, that the quality of much of the compiled Japanese sets is not as good
as would normally be expected for stringent empirical testing. See Mary Brinton, Fact-Rich,
DataPoor:Japan and Sociologists' Heaven and Hell, in DOING FIELD WORK IN JAPAN 195
(Theodore C. Bestor et al. eds., 2003).
12.
West saved some of his most interesting applications of random datasets for a subsequent book. See MARK D. WEST, LAW IN EVERYDAY JAPAN: SEX, SUMO, SUICIDE, AND
STATUTES

13.

(2005).
See, e.g.,

MILHAUPT

&

WEST,

supra note 4, at 47 (referring W.
(1994)).

INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY

BRIAN ARTHUR,
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why organized crime rings operate successfully as grey market service
providers in Japan that seem to disprove Milhaupt and West's explanation.1
The second "missing element" is legal analysis. I feel a bit vulnerable in making this declaration, both in a the-king-has-no-clothes-sense
and because I will mark myself as quaintly antiquated and missing the
point. 5 Milhaupt and West claim to be "unabashed" lawyers, 6 yet they
almost exclusively apply economic and sociological techniques to their
endeavor. I suspect they would respond that good, modem legal research
has moved beyond an exploration of the nature of the law to a full examination of how the law operates. The problem is that Milhaupt and
West often fail to provide a deep explanation of the law.' 7 Therefore, we
cannot judge the strength of their arguments with regard to the operation
of the law. Instead, more often than not, the authors provide only a brief
description of the law, based on secondary sources or without reference,
from which conclusions are drawn.
I do not have the necessary expertise in any of the specific institutions of Japanese corporate governance that Milhaupt and West explore
to show this simply. I do, however, have experience in Japanese insolvency law, which plays a subsidiary role in a number of chapters,' 8 and
from my knowledge in that area, my concern is that, while not incorrectly stating the law per se, Milhaupt and West articulate it in a stylistic
way that serves their intended conclusions at the expense of accuracy.
With that seed of suspicion raised in my head, the authors' failure to
14.
See Frank G. Bennett, Jr., A Forensic Analysis of "The Dark Side of Private Ordering" (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
15.
I have developed elsewhere my argument in favor of respect for traditional legal
scholarship. See Kent Anderson, Kent's World: A PersonalApproach to the Various Worlds of
JapaneseLaw, in Ginsburg, et al., supra note 7; Kent Anderson, The Explosive Global Growth
of Personal Insolvency and the Concomitant Birth of the Study of Comparative Consumer
Bankruptcy, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661 (2004).
16.
MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 3.
17.
There are some exceptions in the book, such as chapter 5 on sokaiya.
18.
See, e.g., Kent Anderson, Japanese Insolvency Law after a Decade of Reform, 42
CANADIAN Bus. L. J. (forthcoming 2006); Kent Anderson, Testing the Model Soft Law Approach to International Harmonisation: A Case-Study of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-BorderInsolvency, 23 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (2004) (examining Japanese insolvency law, among others); Kent Anderson & Stacey Steele, Insolvency, in JAPAN BUSINESS
LAW GUIDE (Veronica Taylor ed., 2003); Kent Anderson & Makoto Ito, Insolvency Law for a
New Century: Japan'sNew Frameworkfor Economic Failures, in LAW IN JAPAN: INTO THE
21ST CENTURY (Dan Foote ed., 2003); Kent Anderson, Small Business Reorganizations: An
Examination of Japan's Civil Rehabilitation Act Considering U.S. Policy Implications and
Foreign Creditors'Practical
Interests, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355 (2001); Kent Anderson, CrossBorder Insolvency: A Proposal Considering the Experiences of Various Common Law Nations, 51 HOKKAIDO L. REv. 1633, 1870 (2001) (in Japanese); Kent Anderson, The CrossBorder Insolvency Paradigm:A Defense of the Modified UniversalApproach Consideringthe
Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.679 (2000).
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provide support for numerous assertions and their citations to general
laws, without reference to specific articles or sections, is troubling. This
is not merely the pedant in me.' 9 Surely we all know from experience
that requiring confirmation with original sources is a distinct feature of
legal research and one which "keeps us honest. 20 Put differently, if
someone bought this book to learn the rules, both formal and informal,
of corporate governance in Japan, they will be disappointed. On the
other hand, someone in pursuit of a political-economy understanding of
how the legal institutions that impact economic endeavors operate in Japan will be ecstatic-in that regard this book is the best available. I
suspect the moral, in clichrd terms, is "to each his own and buyer beware."
Shifting gears from the theoretical and empirical aspects of the book
to its more basic elements, a few items are noteworthy. Most obviously,
this book is not a joint, single collaboration that began with a grand plan
or central message. It is, in essence, a compilation of the writers' law
review articles over the past decade. 2' Noting this in itself is not a criticism. Indeed, I appreciate having these authors' corpus of work brought
together in one convenient location that does not require fiddling with
database search engines. More importantly, for new entrants to the field,
especially students, the ability to have the work assembled thematically
and the overarching threads developed more explicitly than through the
various articles makes the book format very valuable.
This greatest-hits approach, however, does occasionally result in a
temporal lag issue, an inconsistent style, and a diffused or occasionally
hidden central theme. While the temporal lag issue is the most obvious,
it is also the dilemma the authors most successfully overcome. While
they conducted much of their original research in the mid-1990s, tremendous changes in Japanese economic regulation occurred in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, this becomes one of the book's main
points in the final two chapters. It is obvious the authors have updated
their materials and data, thus creating the need for reinterpretation. The
negative side of this process, however, is that occasionally one wonders
why Milhaupt and West present so much information and then issue casIt is nice to see pedants getting some much needed respect recently. See, e.g.,
(2003).
Of course, this is true of all academic disciplines, but what I refer to here20.
positively-is the almost excessive amount of citation characteristic of much legal scholarship.
21.
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at ix-x (listing the eight original articles
from which the seven case studies in the book originate).
22.
A number of authors have or are in the process of addressing this. See, e.g., JEFF
19.

LYNNE TRUSS, EATS, SHOOTS & LEAVES

KINGSTON, JAPAN'S QUIET TRANSFORMATION: SOCIAL CHANGE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN 21ST

CENTURY JAPAN

(2004).
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ual caveats such as "that was until 2003 when it all changed." Stated differently, if this book is partially about the change over the past periods,
then the emphasis seems to be on the wrong side-focusing on what the
system was rather than what it has become or even how it has transformed.
The differing styles of the authors have been handled impressively.
The writers' voice throughout the pbook is consistent. It is obvious that
both Milhaupt and West have spent a fair amount of time rereading, editing, and revising each other's work. This is particularly impressive
considering that the authors not only wrote large parts individually but
even co-wrote a chapter with an unrelated collaborator. 3 That being said,
even without a look at the citations in the introduction,24 it is obvious
from the framing of the chapters which ones are largely the responsibility of the economics-leaning West, which are by the theory-leaning
Milhaupt, and which were originally joint projects. Both individual
styles have their weaknesses. West's focus on economic models sometimes leaves the rest of us bored with the modeling caveats and
seemingly after-the-fact explanations for statistically significant derivations of regressional analysis.' On the other hand, Milhaupt's theoretical
framing often causes my mind to wander rather than perform the necessary mental gymnastics and occasionally leaves me longing for Occam's
famous shaving implement.26 The best chapters, which include the introduction and conclusion, are those on which the two have worked
together.27 By reigning in each other's excessive tendencies and presenting a fuller picture of the issue, Milhaupt and West in these chapters
produce truly enlightening scholarship.
The most difficult and troubling aspect that arises from the authors'
serial and individualistic way of assembling the book is that the claimed
central messages of the greater endeavor are not always obvious, clear,
or, indeed, present. In their conclusion, Milhaupt and West tell us their
central themes are: (1) both formal law and informal norms structure
Japan's economy; (2) Japanese economic institutions are changing; and
(3) actors are responding to the changes. 8 Each of these items is not
readily apparent throughout the book, and the authors certainly do not
clearly include this straightforward explanation of the theme in any of
23.
Chapter 4 is based on work with Geoffrey Miller. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from
the "Jusen" Problem, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1997).
24.
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at ix-x (listing the law review articles from
which the case studies originate).
25.
For example, chapters 2 and 5.
26.
For example, chapters 3 and 4.
Namely, chapters 6-8.
27.
28.
MILHAtUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 241.
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the preceding substantive chapters. Perhaps it is like a Pynchon novel
and these are truths the reader can only divine after the fact. For myself,
I appreciate the upfront nature of much modem legal scholarship that
beats one over the head with its message. The authors themselves are
skilled practitioners of this approach, as each of the chapters seems to address explicitly and directly a separate sub-theme. For example, the
chapter on organized crime is concerned with organized crime/developing
economy theory; the chapter on derivative suits is interested in corporate
agency and procedure issues; the jusen chapter is engaged with bank
regulation theory and political economy; and the venture capital chapter
is involved with fostering innovation questions. Indeed, I suspect it is the
individual law review development of these ideas that results in the multiple discrete sub-themes of each chapter and unwittingly circumvents
the development of the larger ideas. There is likely no easy way to avoid
this problem aside from setting out to write an entirely new book from
scratch. Therefore, for those interested in a broad-picture overview of the
present changes in Japanese economic institutions and actors' responses
to those developments, I suggest concentrating only on the last 35 pages,
where the authors expressly develop their central theme.
III. THE MESSAGE
As noted at the outset, the book is in essence seven case studies on
various broadly defined economic institutions. The introductory chapter
lays down the theoretical and empirical framework discussed in Part II.
The brief three page conclusion chapter makes explicit the three unifying
themes buried within the substantive chapters.
Despite the book's broad title, the seven case studies do not cover
what one might typically expect from a book on Japanese corporate governance or even economic organizations. Instead, they are idiosyncratic,
even quirky, which has been a successful, and entertaining, method for
making mainstream points about Japanese law in the past.29 Thus, chapters 2 to 8 investigate: derivative suits, venture capital, failed home
mortgage lenders (jusen), professional disrupters of annual corporate
general meetings (sokaiya), organized crime working in quasi-legal areas, mergers and acquisitions, and law students' career choices. It is
worth rereading through that list of topics to appreciate fully the alley29.
See, e.g., WEST, supra note 12; J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE
HISTORY: LAW AND EcONOMIC GROWTH (1996); Veronica Taylor, Spectres of Comparison:
Japanese Law and Research, in Ginsburg, et al., supra note 7, at 15-16 ("I realized that I was
looking down the alley ways of Japanese law and its enforcement rather than its tree-lined
boulevards.").
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ways this vehicle travels before arriving at its universal conclusions. Notably, the book does not focus on such prosaic corporate governance
topics as corporate structures, directors' duties, shareholders' rights, disclosure rules, and so forth, though it sometimes mentions them. Also, the
authors-thankfully--do not arrange the book around so-called uniquely
Japanese corporate governance institutions such as keiretsu crossshareholding, lifetime employment, the main bank system, and govern30
ment guidance, though they address these subjects at various points.
The order of the chapters is also not self-evident or explained. Some
groupings are logical, such as placing the chapter on sokaiya and organized crime together or concluding with the most recent data on changes
in employment choices in light of reformed economic institutions. Otherwise, the order seems to follow the publication date of the original law
reviews. Given this fact, I will first address what I see as the most classical corporate governance chapters, viz. derivative suits and M&As; then
the chapters on venture capital and jusen; next the two chapters on organized crime as economic institutions; and finally, the concluding
chapter on actors reacting to the changes.
Finally, one of my own caveats: Milhaupt and West are extremely
talented and well-trained lawyers, and as such, they couch their assertions and arguments with qualifiers and express declarations of
assumptions. Readers will be impressed with their honesty, meticulousness, and prudence. Unfortunately, my summary of their arguments
below, for space reasons, oversimplifies their points and insufficiently
covers their qualifications. Hopefully, this will only motivate readers to
purchase the book to appreciate the unfiltered message.
The book's substantive sections begin strongly with an examination
of the shareholder derivative suit in Japan. This is an excellent tool with
which to begin because the derivative suit is a classic element of modern
corporate governance, allowing for an introduction of some of the standard vocabulary of Japanese economic institutions. Moreover, it is a
powerful case study because a major change in Japan's rules on derivative suits in the mid-1990s allows for clean empirical testing and
theorizing.
A large portion of the chapter introduces the business "treasures"
that traditionally have explained corporate governance in Japan: viz., the
main bank system, keiretsu cross-shareholding, lifetime employment, the
so-called "iron triangle" relations between government and business, and
large captured boards of directors." The authors do not fully explain why
These items are covered most significantly in chapter 2. See
30.
supra note 4, at 13-18.
See id.
31.

MILHAUPT

&

WEST,
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they spend so much time on these shibboleths. Despite the authors'
comments on the importance of informal business norms, none of their
broad or narrow arguments rely on these cultural claims. Moreover, their
large theme-that corporate governance is changing and actors are responding to the altered legal incentives and constraints in rational
ways-disproves any current explanatory value of the earlier generation
concepts. Therefore, I surmise that the authors introduce the "treasures"
to ensure a shared vocabulary with the reader and distinguish themselves
from those who explicitly rely on or reject these concepts. This middle
ground approach is consistent throughout the book and is one of its
strong points, as discussed below.
The specific issues that the derivative suit chapter seeks to address
are, first, the reason behind Japan's rejection of the derivative suit until
1993, and, second, the impetus for its acceptance of the mechanism since
then. The first answer is, in essence, that derivative suits cost too much
and the necessary information was too difficult to obtain.33 The second
answer is, in essence, that the lowering of filing fees made it economically feasible for some lawyers to pursue derivative suits.3 Explaining
why derivative suits work or do not work in Japan is in itself sufficiently
important, but the real value of the message in this case study is in its
simplicity: Japanese actors-like other corporate actors-respond rationally to a changed legal environment. In other words, while all of
those noted cultural explanations add an important gloss to the full explanation, it is simple rational economic behavior that best explains
Japanese actors' responses to legal frameworks 5
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As), or the market for corporate control, is another classical aspect of corporate governance. The standard
line has been that hostile M&As do not happen in Japan because of
cross-shareholding, main bank relationships, and so on. Chapter 7 shows
that the legal and accounting reforms of the late 1990s have resulted in
more activity for corporate control.36 This is true even though mergers
are still comparatively infrequent in Japan and critics have complained
that the revisions do not go far enough. In the authors' words, "evidence
32.
One might guess that this section is included to respond, at least in part, to Ramseyer's repeated assertions, discussed infra, that such institutions never existed. See Curtis J.
Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Banking System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 425 (2002) (responding to Ramseyer's assertion
that most, overall, Japanese economic institutions are myths).
33.
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4 at 19-22.
34.
Id. at 28-37.
35.
See id. at 37.
36.
Incidentally, the sub-theme pursued in this chapter is how organizational diversity
promotes corporate health, which provides some interesting conclusions as a law review article but does not directly contribute to the overall theme of this book.
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suggests a potential social norm shift, as Japanese corporate actors begin
37
to view takeovers as a viable and enduring part of the landscape." The
highly visible 2005 control struggles of Rakuten for Tokyo Broadcasting
Services and Livedoor for Fuji Television seem to have made this conclusion obvious to even the most skeptical." Then again, the peaceful
and backroom settlement of those disputes-as with the jusen problem-might also suggest the same old-boy networks remain unchanged
underneath the new veneer.39
The jusen problem and venture capital are two of the peripheral corporate governance case studies the authors cover. Chapter 4, examining
the jusen issue, takes a detailed historical look at the harbinger of Japan's so-called "bad debt problem" (fuiry6 saiken mondai).4 The jusen
problem was Japan's Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis. Like S&L banks in
the United States, jusen were special home mortgage lenders that overextended themselves when liberalization and competition pushed them
into new lending areas. Unlike the S&L crisis in the United States, which
was largely quarantined from the rest of the banking industry, the jusen
appeared merely as the first victims of a disease endemic throughout the
industry. Thus, the settlement of the jusen crisis was crucial to the resolution of the larger looming issue of bad debt throughout the industry. As
chapter 4 paints in impressive detail, the old suspects of bureaucrats,
businessmen, and politicians eventually brokered the 1996 resolution
late at night in a smoke-filled back room, with consumers and taxpayers
taking the hardest hit. Mihaupt and West argue, correctly I believe, that
the resulting outcry opposed to this opaque resolution was the watershed
that ushered in the increasingly "more explicit, transparent, and legally
oriented rules of the game."4 ' This is an important conclusion that hopein general. 2
fully will not be missed by Japan watchers or policymakers
37.
38.

See, MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4 at 198.
See, e.g., David Ibison, Japanese Rivals Bow Out of Takeover Feud as Old Tradi-

tions Prevail, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 10, 2005 ("Taken together, these two hostile approaches by
Japanese companies against their compatriots have helped create the impression that a more
aggressive, home-grown style of capitalism is emerging in Japan."). The authors are well
aware of this developing area and are already working on it. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, In
the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2171

(2005).

See Ibisen, supra note 38 ("There is plenty to suggest that Japan's corporate land39.
scape is changing, particularly the recent increase in domestic M&A activity. But the way in
which its two most high-profile deals this year were resolved reveals that, under pressure,
Japan's new-style capitalists can look a lot like the old ones.").
Regarding the Japanese bad debt problem, see, e.g., ToMoo TASUKU & K6SAKU
40.
OKAUCHI, FURY6 SAIKEN SHORI BIJINESU: ATARASHII KIN'YiU GYOMU TO TOSAN HO

[The Busi-

ness of Treating Bad Debts: New Financial Administration and Insolvency Law] (1998).
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 99.
41.
The law review-specific sub-issue dealt within this chapter is something Milhaupt
42.
designates the "regulatory cartel." Id. at 74-81.
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The joint venture study tells a different story, but also one that ends
with legal reform resulting in real change, albeit not a "replica [of] the
U.S. template." 3 Chapter 3 asks, first, why is there so little venture capital in Japan, and, second, have the legal changes implemented to foster
entrepreneurial finance succeeded? In answering the first question, Milhaupt and West suggest that in the early 1990s: (1) Japan did not have
large independent sources of funding; (2) there was less opportunity to
create an exit strategy in Japan than elsewhere due to an underdeveloped
IPO market; (3) corporate law did not provide an effective investment
structure; (4) relative labor immobility hindered entrepreneurialism; and
(5) Japan was more risk adverse than other economies in investment
strategy." Explained in this way, this is the chapter that relies most heavily on classical Japanese business explanations. Each of these points
derives from the concepts of the main bank system, keiretsu crossshareholding, or the lifetime employment ideal. Nevertheless, the chapter briefly reviews how in the 1990s, with an eye towards the U.S.
venture capital environment, laws were changed to free up pension funds
for investing, develop the nascent IPO market, create a new investmentfriendly corporate structure, and allow stock options. The end result was
a rise in venture capital funding in Japan, though Japan has not reproduced the dynamic U.S. environment, owing to the fundamentally
different institutional structure within which it takes place. Milhaupt and
West draw from this conclusion the very sensible advice that due to the
different institutions at play in each state, reformers should not expect
that transplanting legal
mechanisms from one state to another will pro45
duce identical results.
Milhaupt and West continue speaking largely to foreign reformers in
chapters 5 and 6 on the role of organized crime in Japan's economic
makeup. Their primary message is that organized crime will flourish in
quasi-legal areas when legal rules create inefficient systems. This is because the Mafioso will privately order themselves to provide the missing
services. Therefore, if reformers in Japan or anywhere else want to tackle
organized crime, it is best to starve it at its roots by creating efficient legal
institutions that allow legitimate actors to capture the markets. This is a
tremendous argument because of its simplicity and easily implemented
recommendations. As discussed above, however, I worry that the complexity of the data is stylized to promote the strength of the assertion. Even if
this is the case, this chapter still rings true in both its argument and conclusion, as well as its worthwhile descriptions of Japan's loan sharking and
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 52-64.
Id. at 64-66.
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repo-man world of general meeting operators, fixers, check dodgers, dispute consultants, and other riffraff. 6
The final substantive case study, chapter 8, examines Japanese legitimate legal actors' choices in the revised regulatory environment of
the early 2000s. I believe this chapter is the book's most significant. At
its essence, it concerns where graduating law students seek employment.
From this, Milhaupt and West argue that the legal reforms of the 1990s
are having an effect and, more significantly, that the center of power in
Japan has consequently shifted from the bureaucracy to the private bar.
The crucial middle step in this argument is Chalmers Johnson's longheld assertion that Japan's ruling elite graduate from specific law schools
and move into specific ministries, from where they direct "all major policy innovations. 48 Thus, because recent elite law graduates are now
choosing the bar (i.e., private legal employment) over the bureaucracy,
Japan's locus of governance has moved from the central government to
private actors ordered by law.
Milhaupt and West's innovative testing of their assertion convinces
me of the correctness of their conclusion and its significance. It is important, however, to identify some of the leaps of faith necessary for its
making. First, the authors predominately employ data about employment
options of Tokyo University undergraduate law students as a proxy for
what elite legal actors view as the most influential career. Second, they
argue that elite legal actors really only choose between two options: becoming a lawyer (bengoshi) in a major Tokyo law firm or becoming a
bureaucrat in one of four central government ministries.4 9 Third, though
they show there is a huge disparity between wages, they suggest the
choice to go into private legal practice may be used as an indicator of
where the locus of governance lies.
My own contrarian suspicion is that like many of the classical myths
of Japanese business and society, the idea that Tokyo University law students, upon becoming bureaucrats, were the most important actors in
Japan has always been suspect. This is not merely because, as Milhaupt
and West deftly show, they are now choosing to be lawyers rather than
bureaucrats, but because I do not fully accept that Japan's elite: (1) came
largely from Tokyo University law graduates; (2) went to work as bureaucrats of one of the four ministries; or (3) effectively directed society
through government intervention. Rather, from my observation, the 130
Id. at 157-60.
46.
Id. at 229.
47.
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 21 (1982).
48.
MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 209 ("Elite law students in Japan have two
49.
basic, and until very recently, mutually exclusive career options: The bureaucracy or the legal
profession.").
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million person milieu of Japan has always been much more diverse and
dynamic. 0 The heads of the Japanese art, sports, and media scenes, not
to mention the large majority of prime ministers," did not graduate from
Tokyo University Law Faculty. The people who made Japan the global
leader in electronics, cars, and animation were the ubiquitous salaryman,
not bureaucrats from Todai. And the seemingly endless stream of scandals, not to mention dealing with Kafkian government officials, always
made me question whether the Japanese government was as wisely controlling as often claimed." Regardless of these suspicions, this chapter is
so finely crafted in balancing its argumentative approach and making
explicit the book's sometimes obscure overarching theme that it would
be extremely difficult to resist the persuasive pull of its assertions.
IV. THE GENERATIONAL SHIFT
It is the skill with which they describe Japanese economic institutions, combined with the empirical stringency with which they test their
descriptions, that set Milhaupt and West apart. For those within the small
community of comparative Japanese law scholars, my declaration of
Milhaupt and West as the leaders of the next generation will not raise
much surprise. Both have been productive scholars in comparative Japanese law for most of the last decade. They have both ascended to two of
the only named chairs of Japanese law at any law school-the Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions at Columbia University for
Milhaupt and the Nippon Life Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan for West. 3
What is necessary to set one generation apart from the next, however, is not simply personal achievement in the field. Rather, eras are
defined by distinguishing them from their predecessors. The state of the
discipline of comparative Japanese law was well plotted by one of its
leaders in this journal a decade ago.5 Three features differentiate the new
50.

A variety of citations might be provided here, but for one I enjoy, see MULTICUL-

TURAL JAPAN: PALAEOLITHIC TO POSTMODERN (Donald Denoon et al. eds., 1996).

51.
Only one of the last 10 prime ministers was a graduate of Tokyo University and
only a quarter of all the post-Occupation prime ministers were Todai graduates. See Wikipedia.org, List of Prime Ministers of Japan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-ofPrime
MinistersofJapan (last visited April 5, 2006).
52.
West himself is the leading expert in English on Japanese scandals. See Mark D.
West, Secrets, Sex, and Spectacle: The Rules of Scandal in Japan and America, U. CHI. L.
REV (forthcoming 2006).
53.
See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4.
54.
See John 0. Haley, EducatingLawyers for a Global Economy, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
733, 736-41 (reviewing LAW AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS (Yukio
Yanagida et al. eds., 1994)). See also Frank K. Upham, The Place of JapaneseLegal Studies in
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era into which Milhaupt and West are leading from that earlier phase.
First, periods are defined by iconic leaders.5 The two people from whom
I suggest Milhaupt and West are receiving the field's leadership mantle
are John Haley of Washington University and Mark Ramseyer of Harvard University. Milhaupt and West themselves seem to confirm this by
explicitly acknowledging in their first chapter that they are standing on
the shoulders of these predecessors. 6 While there are other extremely
talented researchers of comparative Japanese law from the same generation, including Setsuo Miyazawa, Malcolm Smith, and Frank Upham, 7 I
think most would agree that Haley and Ramseyer have stood apart in
their framing of the issues of the discipline. 8
The issue that Haley and Ramseyer have most obviously defined and
which has come to represent their generation is whether law in Japan
really matters at all. This issue, which has also been addressed in the
context of Japan's comparatively low litigation rates, was, and indeed
continues to be, hugely important. As has been well documented before, 9 Haley set the process in motion in a 1978 article that argued that
the assumption of the previous generation's academics, media, government, and general public-that law was inconsequential in Japan
because of unstated cultural norms-was suspect6 He did not state that
law actually mattered in Japan so much as he asserted that it was inconsequential because it was so ineffective-not because there was a
American Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 639 (reviewing the place of Japanese law
studies in the United States).
55.
For example, the Warren Court, Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and the New Deal were
all periods defined by their iconic leaders rather than by the multitude of people involved with
formulating and implementing what these eras represent.
MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 4, at 3.
56.
57.
Like in Haley, supra note 54, at 736 n.5, it might be wise to provide a long list of
others working in the field who deserve mention (including, inter alia, Harald Baum, Frank
Bennett, Eric Feldman, Daniel Foote, Tom Ginsburg, David Johnson, Robert Leflar, Mark
Levin, Gerald McAlinn, Luke Nottage, Kenneth Port, Dan Rosen, Veronica Taylor, and Leon

Wolff), but, with apologies, I will refrain from doing so in the interest of economy.
58.
The two central issues that have formed the contours of the field and which Haley
and Ramseyer have framed are the legal consciousness issue, discussed below, and the issue of
the independence of the Japanese judiciary. See, e.g., J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN,

JAPAN

MEASURING

(2003);

JOHN

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

0.

HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW

OF JUDGING IN

(1998). These citations are

merely representative, as both writers have made their arguments frequently in other publications. One of the other potential contenders for the title of iconic leader has recently described
the split between Ramseyer and Haley in detail. See Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or
Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary,30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 421
(2005).
See, e.g., KENNETH L. PORT, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN
59.
JAPAN 87-88 (1996).
John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359
60.
(1978).
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cultural preference for unstated norms. 6' Ramseyer responded in 1988
that, in fact, law did matter because everyone was efficiently organizing
matters in its shadow, if not in the courts.62 Since that time, the limited
number of scholars and students with the linguistic ability to operate in
the field have dedicated a large amount of research to adding their two
yen to this debate. 63 This effort might arguably still be justified, as the
media, government, and general public occasionally appear to operate on
the assumption-from two generations ago-that Japanese law is all
about unstated cultural norms. 6 Given the limited number of scholars
interested and capable of working in comparative Japanese law, however,
the energy the present generation has dedicated to refining and recasting
this question seems, at best, mottainai (unworthy) 6 and, at worst, mudazukai (wasteful)."6
Just as iconic leaders can define an age, so too can issues.67 This has
been the case with the relevance of law debate in comparative Japanese
law over the last 25 years. One of the most admirable aspects of Milhaupt and West's book is that it pushes the discussion beyond this now
hackneyed question. Milhaupt and West begin with the assumption that
61.
See id.
62.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan,
14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988). See also J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263

(1989).
63.
West and Milhaupt themselves have contributed to this debate. See, e.g., Mark D.
West, The Resolution of Karaoke Disputes: The Calculation of Institutionsand Social Capital,
28 J. JAPANESE STUD. 301 (2002); CURTIS MILHAUPT ET AL., JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT
107-41 (2001) (providing extracts from others' work to set up the issue).
64.
In one of the better examples of this phenomenon, one writer recently commented
generally about Asian justice (albeit not Japanese legal norms specifically): "You need to
understand two things about Asian justice. First, it is tinged with vengeance. The system
appears to acknowledge no prospect of redemption and forgiveness. Second, it is overlaid with
this notion of 'face', of not wanting to be embarrassed." Andrew West, Does Asian Justice
Deserve Our Respect, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 15, 2006, available at http://
blogs.smh.com.au/thecontrarian/archives/2006/02/asian-values_do.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2006).
65.
"Mottainai" became a catch-phrase of sorts in Japan in 2005 when Nobel Peace
Prize winner Wangari Maathai used the word to explain her environmental philosophy of
restricted consumption. See, e.g., Mottainai,MAINICHI SHINBUN, Feb. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.mainichi-msn.co.jp/shakai/wadailmottainailarchive/news/2005/02/20050218orgOO
m010999000c.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). It is with that connotation of being slightly
unnecessary that I use the word here. I contrast it with "mudazukai," which I feel has a sharper
edge of being absolutely unnecessary.
66.
The late comparative Japanese law scholar Stephan Salzberg also seemed to agree
that the time had come to move the debate beyond this issue. See Stephan M. Salzberg, Book
Review, 10 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 573 (2000) (reviewing ERIC FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF
RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY (2000)).
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law matters and then show how economic actors modify their behavior
in light of legal rules. 6 They go beyond pure rational choice theory by
also taking social norms seriously. This broader perspective of both law
and culture will be the hallmark of the next generation.
A third element that distinguishes the immediately prior generation
is the collaborative spirit in which Milhaupt and West work-in contrast
to their more divisive and mercurial predecessors. Some have explained
the nearly polemic methodological orientation of U.S. research on Japan
as a uniquely American attribute, deriving more from domestic forces
than any inherent quality of Japanese law. 69 Whether or not this is true,
Milhaupt and West appear willing to allow for messier theoretical explanations that reflect a more complex reality, where ideas and influences
overlap and bulge rather than fit into neat theoretical boxes. The authors'
willingness to make a subtler and correspondingly more complex argument deprives their message of some of the power of their predecessors'
straightforward arguments, but their approach satisfies more careful
readers through its insight into the vastly complex world it seeks to explain.
V. CONCLUSION
In Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan,
Milhaupt and West provide the reader with a multilayered and nuanced
image of corporate governance in Japan at the beginning of the twentyfirst century. The authors paint this image through an almost idiosyncratic list of case studies, but the broad lessons are clear: the Japanese
economy is structured through both formal law and informal norms, the
economic institutions are in noticeable flux at the moment, and it is undeniable that Japanese economic actors are responding to the new
environment.
Their argument is so straightforward and well-presented, whatever
small disagreements there might be around the edges, that one would be
very hard pressed to disagree. Moreover, while presenting this overarching theme, the individual chapters themselves are valuable case studies
describing interesting and important discrete institutions in Japan. These
studies establish the value of the book alone.

68.

This is best seen inchapter 8.

69.

Tom Ginsburg, Luke Nottage & Hiroo Sono, The Worlds, Vicissitudes, and Futures

of Japan's Law, in Ginsburg et al., supra note 7, at 1; Luke Nottage, "JapanischesRecht,"
Japanese Law, and Nihon-h6: Towards New Transnational Collaboration in Research and
Teaching, in Ginsburg et al., supra note 7, at 20.
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Beyond simply successfully describing economic institutions in Japan and providing a thesis to make sense of those institutions, I suggest
this book marks the beginning of a new era in the field of comparative
Japanese law. Many will quibble with my definition of a new era and my
demarcation of its lines. Nonetheless, I am confident that all knowledgeable people will agree that Milhaupt and West have made a major
contribution to the field.

